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The debate that might have developed in Canadian historiography, about how new
tools from social semiotics and cultural studies could be deployed both by socialist
historians and by those asking newer, less class-based questions, never did happen.
Instead, what appeared in print was invective. The impression was created that to be
theoretical was to be anti-labour history and anti-Marxist, and young progressive
historians tended to conclude that, if they wanted to ask the “old” questions about
class power, women’s oppression, and imperialism or racism, there was no need to
read any theory. The potential for a number of overlapping debates on key method-
ological issues was thus wasted. The new social history gave us a number of new
tools to do research, but the sophistication in research methods was generally
employed to explore some rather simple (if important) research questions. The basic
question driving socialist feminist inquiries as well as Marxist ones was: whose
interests are served? The author explains her conclusion that it may be more pro-
ductive to put inquiries into interests temporarily on hold, and experiment with
questions that focus on effects.
Le débat qui pourrait s’être développé dans l’historiographie canadienne, quant à
la façon dont les nouveaux outils de la sémiotique sociale et des études culturelles
pourraient servir aux historiens socialistes et à ceux qui posent des questions plus
nouvelles, moins fondées sur les classes, n’a jamais eu lieu. Plutôt, ce qui a été écrit
était injurieux. On a créé l’impression que le fait d’être théorique revenait à
s’opposer à l’histoire de la vie ouvrière et au marxisme, et les jeunes historiens pro-
gressistes ont eu tendance à conclure que s’ils voulaient poser les « vieilles » ques-
tions sur le pouvoir des classes, l’oppression des femmes et l’impérialisme ou le
racisme, rien ne servait de lire la théorie. L’on a donc gâché la chance de tenir un
certain nombre de débats chevauchants sur des questions méthodologiques clés. La
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nouvelle histoire sociale nous a donné un certain nombre d’outils nouveaux pour
faire de la recherche, mais la sophistication des méthodes de recherche a générale-
ment servi à explorer des questions de recherche plutôt simples (bien qu’impor-
tantes). La question de base guidant les études féministes socialistes tout comme les
études marxistes était : quels intérêts sert-on? L’auteure explique sa conclusion
qu’il est peut-être plus productif de mettre les études sur les intérêts en veilleuse et
de faire l’essai de questions axées sur les effets.
Situating Theory: Toronto 1976
HAVING SPENT most of my undergraduate years studying philosophy and
having become  even before finishing my BA  dissatisfied with discus-
sions of the logical consistency of this or that great mans ideas, I became
increasingly drawn to the new social history: the materialist, loosely Marxist
studies developed in the 1960s and 1970s as a challenge to old-fashioned
nation-centred storytelling. In retrospect, it would be possible to see the par-
ticular way in which I came to the new social history as presaging my even-
tual discontent with it. The book that opened my eyes to the tremendous
possibilities of critical and historically specific analyses of everyday ideas
and habitual attitudes was not E. P. Thompsons The Making of the English
Working Class (which I did not read until I was into my PhD studies), but
rather Mikhail Bakhtins Rabelais and His World, which a quirky professor
teaching intellectual history had dared to put on his third-year course list in
1974.1 If I now wanted to construct a narrative giving coherence to what at
the time seemed like gut feelings about what counted as interesting work, I
could point out that, by approaching the study of everyday life through
Bakhtin rather than Thompson or the Annales school, I would eventually
realize that my talents for fact-grubbing, atheoretical history are limited.
Despite all my efforts to become a proper socialist-feminist social historian
(including a post-doctoral project to write a never-published book grandi-
osely entitled Gender and the Making of the Working Class), I am more
likely to contribute to the worlds supply of marginally useful works by forg-
ing a path including a great deal of historical research but fundamentally
motivated by questions outside the historians purview.
That the path I have traced in my work is interdisciplinary to an unusual
degree is more a matter of necessity than of virtue. With a BA in philosophy
I would not have been admitted to a doctoral programme in history even if I
had found one that suited my inclinations. I was accepted into the McGill
philosophy department and almost went there to study under Charles Taylor,
but Social and Political Thought at York University, then a new, frankly left-
wing programme that had not yet graduated any PhDs, was the exciting
choice.
When I began graduate studies there in 1976, the new social history was
1 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963);
Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968).
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flourishing in many places. During my first year of graduate school, George
Rudé came down once a week from Concordia to teach a seminar on revo-
lutions  in Social and Political Thought, not in the History Department 
in which I was an eager student. Eventually Rudé, by then very elderly, acted
as external examiner for my PhD thesis. He was less than happy, however,
with the way in which my dissertation, which recovered the economic and
social writings of the French socialists of 1848, ended with a critical reflec-
tion on orthodox Marxisms parody of utopian socialism. Why are you
parading Engels across the stage and throwing tomatoes at him? Rudé
crankily asked during my oral defence. This meant that I left Social and
Political Thought with no historians to regard as mentors or even as casual
contacts, other than feminist friends who were all in the early stages of their
PhD studies.
After my PhD I did, as mentioned, valiantly attempt to do real social
history, courtesy of a SSHRC post-doctoral fellowship, but my heart was not
as much in that work as in the local feminist organizing and populist writing
which came to occupy the centre of my world in the mid-1980s. In engaging
with feminism in Torontos lively community scene, I discovered the sort of
work now called Theory. Seminar discussions in Social and Political
Thought, which had been dominated by concerns directly imported from
New York or the other American sites from which most of the faculty had
come, now appeared strangely scholastic, by comparison to what was going
on downtown in the bookstores and cafés and political groups. The Theory I
favoured at that time (roughly from 1980 to 1985) was the kind of socialist
feminism that speculated about whether patriarchy and capitalism should be
thought of as layers of oppression or as strands in a sort of double helix.
Michele Barrett, Mary McIntosh, Sheila Rowbotham, and their counterparts
in the United States (Linda Gordon, Ros Petchesky, the Feminist Studies col-
lective) were our intellectual heroines. A few particularly original minds 
my friend Lorna Weir, for instance  struggled to comprehend the work of
Michel Foucault, an author then unknown in any York syllabus, but it took
me many years to realize the significance of his work.
Politically, I have perhaps not moved very far from that socialist feminism
of the early 1980s. For example, I now am on the Feminist Studies collective
myself, in which position I read and approve articles for publication, often
by Third World authors, which provide more concrete and sophisticated
analyses of what are largely still the same old issues: the interaction
between sexual oppression and job ghettoization; the way in which imperial-
ist forces are in various fragmented ways challenged or evaded by those who
can never hope to enjoy any disposable income; the international division
of labour. While teaching at York (from 1989 to 1992), I also found that,
despite my growing intellectual differences with the old socialist crowd,
they were in a sense my family, my reference point.
Although continuing to attend all the demos, I became dissatisfied with
the tools of socialist feminism and materialist historiography fairly quickly
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after resuming academic work (as opposed to movement-based writing)
around 1986 and 1987. Given that both my political practice and my intel-
lectual work had slowly shifted to sexual politics and, more broadly, to what
came to be called moral regulation (mainly after Philip Corrigan, whose
brief stay at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education had a profound
effect on local socialist feminism2), it was not surprising that I felt alienated
from labour history and related enterprises. My first two substantial refereed
journal articles, both published in 1988, dealt with old socialist feminist
questions: labour legislation affecting women, on one hand, and prostitution
on the other, both largely in the context of nineteenth-century Britain. The
articles tried to ask non-socialist and non-labour questions, however, partic-
ularly the Victorian Studies article of which I am still fond, significantly
entitled The Love of Finery: Fashion and the Fallen Woman in Late Victo-
rian British Social Discourse.3
This brings me, finally, to the issue of discourse analysis. I came to dis-
course analysis by two quite independent processes. First, my dissatisfaction
with materialist, class-focused historys tools for analysing moral regulation
led me to explore other potential sources of insights and research methods.
As has been the case for many people studying sexuality and moral issues,
semiotics in the broad sense  the study of signs and of the constitution and
circulation of meanings  was particularly intriguing. In the mid-1980s a
number of British and Australian scholars borrowed the humanities-based,
text-focused tools of semiotics for the purpose of analysing social relations,
in the process building the important fields of cultural studies and social
semiotics. These new, inherently interdisciplinary literatures allowed me to
recontextualize and thus redefine my own work. My PhD thesis had been a
work of intellectual history; now, however, I was able to link my previous
background in philosophy and history to cultural studies and related enter-
prises, something that enabled me to go beyond intellectual history and
eventually find a home in a sociology department. (This was by no means a
unique experience; a good number of other people with PhDs in Social and
Political Thought have gone on to jobs in sociology departments, even
though many of us had avoided sociology as undergraduates.) Sociology
proved to be more friendly, institutionally, to these new intellectual trends
2 Some departments at OISE pioneered socialist-feminist and radical feminist intellectual work that
was not then deemed acceptable in most other Canadian universities. Thus, when the noted British
historical sociologist Philip Corrigan was hired in OISEs sociology department in the early 1980s, he
immediately found a place that was unusually receptive to his neo-Marxist approach to moral regula-
tion. Corrigans doctoral students, including Kari Dehli, Gary Kinsman, and Debi Brock, went on to
disseminate and modify Corrigans moral regulation approach, pursuing historical sociological
studies of Canadian practices of moral regulation.
3 Mariana Valverde,  Giving the Female a Domestic Turn: The Legal, Social and Moral Regulation
of Womens Work in British Cotton Mills, 18201850, Journal of Social History, vol. 21, no. 4
(1988), pp. 619634, and The Love of Finery: Fashion and the Fallen Woman in Late Victorian
Social Discourses, Victorian Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (1989), pp. 168188.
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(cultural studies, feminist theory, and later postcolonial theory) than either
philosophy or history.
Second, and probably more important, was that I taught in three or four
disciplines but never in history departments, not even a single course. The
closest I came was teaching a Womens Studies course in the history of fem-
inism to students who, by and large, cared little about history. My teaching
work (before my current incarnation as a criminologist) involved theory
and historical sociology rather than history proper. And I am sufficiently
materialist to think that the curriculum one teaches  especially when, as a
junior professor, one is always deferring to real or imagined canons  has a
great impact on ones development.
In the late eighties, historians came to be my main work-based friends: the
informal economy group that eventually produced the Gender Conflicts
anthology4 was my chosen family over a period of several years, during
which I taught in six departments spread among three universities. The other
group members defined themselves as historians, whereas for me the histo-
rian label never quite fit  an unease that would eventually result in my
pragmatically calling myself a sociologist, since sociology seemed to have
the most room for someone who is philosophically trained but likes to root
around in archives.
Discourse Analysis and Canadian History as Institution
The label sociologist meant that I could experiment with discourse analy-
sis more freely than those young feminist historians who, while interested
in new ways of analysing archival and published documents, nevertheless
felt constrained by the practices of history departments and of proper his-
tory journals. People working on imperial or Third World history may possi-
bly have more freedom to try out new tools, but Canadian history is a small
and highly conservative field, especially at the level of methodology. I was
not in the running for Canadian history jobs, however, and went to the Cana-
dian Historical Association as a mere fellow traveller. This meant I had the
luxury of experimenting with new tools, and this I did, both in a book pub-
lished as Canadian social history and in related theoretical articles in soci-
ology journals that I did not send to my historian friends.5 The tools of
semiotics and rhetoric  techniques for examining how everyday metaphors
and allegories change peoples consciousness and construct the world with-
out ever having to be translated into rational statements  held particular
fascination for me, since, in the course of researching the social purity move-
4 Franca Iacovetta and Mariana Valverde, eds., Gender Conflicts: New Essays in Women’s History (Tor-
onto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
5 Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1880s–
1920s (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991); As if Subjects Existed: Discourses and Social Sub-
jectivity, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 28, no. 3 (May 1991), pp. 173187;
and The Rhetoric of Reform: Tropes and the Moral Subject, International Journal of the Sociology
of Law, vol. 18, no. 1 (1990), pp. 6173.
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ment in Canada, I found the usual left-history language of social control
inadequate to explain the movements success. Among other things, the
social purity movement spent at least as much energy exhorting middle-class
men and women zealously to guard their bodies and their minds as it did
policing working-class leisure. Labour and working-class history, especially
in Canada, had little to say about the practices of ethical self-formation of
the philanthropic reformers.6
It is curious that the experiments undertaken by myself and by some
real historians (Gareth Stedman Jones comes to mind) in the late eighties
were generally regarded, by most left historians, as motivated by a philo-
sophical commitment to the realm of ideas and by a political desire to
avoid Marxisms revolutionary implications. Indeed, there was a slippage
between accusations of idealist epistemology and intimations that one had
gone conservative, as if an interest in the world of signs and meaning carried
an inherent tendency to toryism. In 1988 I was in London over reading week
and had the opportunity to hear a preliminary version of Stedman Joness
analysis of the cockney.7 The lecture struck me as a brilliant demonstra-
tion of how tools from cultural studies could be brought to bear on the ever-
elusive key question of English labour history: how was it that the revolu-
tionary fervour of the 1790s and of the Chartist period gave way to a self-
satisfied pursuit of status and privilege for union-protected masculine skills
by the mid-nineteenth century? Stedman Joness attention to music hall lyr-
ics and other ephemera of popular culture was to me exemplary because,
whatever the shifts in his own political commitments, such tools could sug-
gest new answers to questions that had never been satisfactorily answered by
labour historians whose gaze focused exclusively on the workplace.
Unfortunately, the debate that might have happened  about how new
tools from social semiotics and cultural studies could be deployed both by
old socialists and by those asking newer, less class-based quesions 
never did happen, at least in print. Instead, what we got was invective.
Edward Thompsons brilliant polemic against Althusser was inappropriately
used as a hammer against historians daring to use new tools, in English Can-
ada as well as in the United Kingdom. Bryan Palmer, Thompsons self-
styled Canadian son, ended up making a career of such invective.8 Since
Canadian historians, even the young and feminist and/or queer ones, seem to
be by temperament a timid lot, the vitriolic character of Palmers attacks
meant that people shied away from any discussion of theory for fear of
becoming embroiled in polemics.
6 Some social historians such as Seth Koven have explored this problematic in recent years.
7 Gareth Stedman Jones, The Cockney (lecture, University of Sussex, 1988), later published in R.
Samuel, ed., Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity (London: Routledge,
1989), vol. 3.
8 Bryan Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History
(Philadephia: Temple University Press, 1990).
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There were soapbox prophets on the other side, too. Joan Scotts snobbish
dismissal of womens history in favour of a rather simplistic application of
deconstructive textual methods to historical sources was met, in Canada at
least, with silence rather than with reasoned argument.9 This may have been
because few social historians had bothered to read even Foucaults histories,
much less Derridas turgid philosophical texts. But if some people stayed
silent due to a becoming sense of modesty, my participation in numerous
informal conversations and some formal panel discussions suggests a less
flattering explanation, namely that most social historians felt no need to read
theory: they could make up their minds about discourse analysis unencum-
bered by much knowledge even of the relatively accessible tools of cultural
studies, much less the more recondite analytical techniques of deconstruc-
tion. One would not have expected established historians suddenly to take
six months out of their lives to deal with totally unfamiliar theoretical
debates, but one might have expected younger, more enthusiastic doctoral
students to have sought ways to improve on the toolkits they inherited from
their professors. But since the impression had been created that to be theoret-
ical was to be anti-labour history and anti-Marxist, young progressive histo-
rians tended to conclude that, if they wanted to ask the old questions about
class power, womens oppression, and imperialism or racism, there was no
need to read any theory: theoreticians were, as a group, either conservative
or antipolitical.
The potential for a number of overlapping debates on absolutely key
methodological issues was thus wasted. Most Canadian historians continued
to believe, all through the 1980s and 1990s, that to practise discourse analy-
sis, even on an experimental basis, meant that one was a full-fledged Hege-
lian for whom only ideas were real. One key source of this confusion
between research methodology and philosophical commitment was the con-
stant conflation of ideas and texts. Few historians  and perhaps also
few sociologists  realized that the famous linguistic turn was not
inspired by nineteenth-century Hegelianism but rather by post-idealist liter-
ary methods focusing on texts and discourses, with these entities being
regarded not as either individual Great Mens ideas or crystallizations of the
Zeitgeist, but rather as contingent assemblages of textual relations whose
logic could always be shown to escape the intentions of the author, thus
separating the study of texts or discourses from the traditional inquiry into
Ideas.10 My own book on social purity, for instance, which studies objects
like Salvation Army matchboxes and soap bars sold by the Womans Chris-
tian Temperance Union as texts, was considered by some historians of my
acquaintance as fundamentally the same as old-fashioned intellectual his-
9 Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
10 For present purposes I am not drawing the otherwise key distinction between Derridean texts and
Foucauldian discourses, but merely demonstrating how both of these post-idealist terms marked a
fundamental departure from the history of ideas.
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tory. The actual and potential consequences of my methodological decision
to put more energy into analysing matchboxes and soap ads than into reading
S. D. Chowns sermons  though without ignoring the latter  passed
unnoticed, if the reviews of The Age of Light, Soap and Water that I read are
any indication.
The chain of assumptions  that to study meanings is to claim that ideas
move the world and that there is nothing outside discourse  proved very
hard to dislodge, partly because, like many other chains of associations, it
was rarely articulated as a logical argument. Constructing the issue of
method in time-honoured binary fashion (you are either an idealist or a mate-
rialist; you either study texts or you document peoples experience; you are
either against us or with us), people on both sides of the battle insisted on
seeing people like Joan Scott as the true prophets of a gospel that one had to
accept or reject in toto. Indeed, if Joan Scott had not existed, the labour left
would have had to invent her. But since she did exist, the political economy
crowd focused on her almost exclusively. This meant that little attention was
paid to people like Judy Walkowitz, who used many tools from cultural stud-
ies to analyse how micropowers beyond class and gender work, but who
never got on a soapbox to make general ontological claims about what is
real11 and who could never be construed as the witch of postmodernism. I
tried to do my bit to rectify the situation and generate a more level-headed
debate among progressive historians and other Canadian scholars in two
long review essays for Labour/ Le Travail commissioned by Bryan Palmer.12
I cannot, of course, judge whether these had an effect independent of similar
arguments made elsewhere. Insofar as these interventions had any impact, I
think it was confined to making some younger historians feel that it was all
right to use just a little bit of discourse analysis when a text they encountered
in research seemed particularly rhetorical. Moralistic discourses on sexu-
ality and overtly racist statements found in archival sources tended to
become the only materials for which any tools from cultural studies were
thought to be appropriate.
This points to one of the most unfortunate features of the non-debate on
discourse. It is of course easier to see how the Salvation Armys metaphor of
fire might serve to invoke several different and equally powerful feelings
and desires than it is to analyse the discourse of federal tax-cutting or the
administrative details of municipal licensing schemes. If discourse analysis
is to be more than a passing fashion, however, we will have to learn to use it
to analyse both texts that are not obviously rhetorical and information for-
mats that are not textual.
My own interest in discourse analysis was always focused on the social
11 Judith Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
12 Mariana Valverde, Poststructuralist Gender Historians: Are We Those Names?, Labour/ Le Travail,
vol. 25 (Spring 1990), pp. 227236, and The Making of a Gendered Working Class [review essay
of Christine Stansells City of Women], Labour/ Le Travail, vol. 22 (Fall 1988), pp. 247258.
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effect of discourse. Unlike literary analysts who stop at the internal workings
of meaning, I saw my task as understanding the way in which symbols and
rhetorical tropes act to change the world even while purporting merely to
describe it, to invert Marxs dictum.13 This dictated a careful and limited use
of literary tools, as I outlined in some theoretical articles published between
1988 and 1990. This interest in social and historical analyses (rather than in
the study of the internal organization of texts) also determined the path I
took in the face of a fork in the road that, although rarely discussed or even
recognized in English Canada, could be regarded as a major turning point in
recent intellectual history. This fork or switch point  an image that I use
with much hesitation, since the choices were neither clearly marked nor
mutually exclusive  could be called, for the sake of convenience, the dif-
ference between structuralist, systematic discourse analysis uncovering the
hidden rules of cultural systems and the sort of poststructuralist, historical
discourse analysis that emphasizes breaks, ambiguities, and instabilities,
both in social contexts and in meaning.
Foucault and the Writing of History:
The Myth of Foucauldian “Discourse Analysis”
I was introduced to structuralist discourse analysis through the work of
Roland Barthes. While I admired his brilliance in establishing the codes and
rules forming the semiotic systems of everyday cultural experience, I did not
want simply to analyse signs as I found them: I wanted to see how they had
come into being, what they had replaced, and how exactly they had an effect
on their audience. That is, my interest in semiotics was thoroughly social
and historical. Barthes and other high structuralist literary scholars were
for me exciting but not sufficient. I had read Louis Althusser years back, in
the late seventies. Since I was thoroughly trained in Hegelian dialectics (and
was in fact then one of the few living fans of Georg Lukacs), my attitude to
Althussers writings was, predictably, a mixture of horror and contempt: hor-
ror that anyone should place oneself in a theoretical heaven above and
beyond the ideological apparatuses that supposedly shape everyone elses
subjectivity, and contempt for Althussers own contemptuous attitude
toward history.
Foucaults early writings, although not falling squarely within either liter-
ary or Marxist structuralism, were profoundly shaped by the powerful intel-
lectual currents of structuralist Marxist theory and structuralist literary and
cultural analysis. One way to construct a common denominator linking the
very diverse intellectual practices that all went under the umbrella term of
structuralism is to point out that structuralism tried to overcome the old
nineteenth-century debate about whether subjectivity or objectivity is pri-
mary by focusing on relations rather than on either objects or subjects. Struc-
turalist linguistics, for example, saw meaning as constituted relationally,
13 Valverde, As if Subjects Existed.
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rather than inherent either in the object itself or in the subjective intentions
of the signs user. While Foucault was resolutely opposed to structuralisms
antihistorical tendencies, nevertheless he retained this fundamental insight
about the importance of relations as sites of analysis (an insight that one
could, if one wanted, trace back to Marx ... but thats another story). As Paul
Veyne explains, Foucaults philosophy is not a philosophy of discourse
but a philosophy of relation. For relation is the name of what has been called
structure.14 The fact that Foucault  as was perhaps inevitable in the
France of the 1960s  drew heavily on some structuralist insights may have
contributed to the unfortunate and mistaken belief that his works were trying
to substitute discourse analysis for history writing, since discourse analy-
sis was at one level a structuralist invention that Foucault modified and bor-
rowed for his own idiosyncratic use in his work of the 1960s.
Whether or not Foucaults early work can, without grave injustice, be
described as structuralist (a question that need not be considered here since
Canadian historians were not asking it), the fact remained that many people
thought that the simple use of the word discourse sufficed to convict Fou-
cault not only of practising discourse analysis but even of holding the onto-
logical belief that discourse is the only reality. It is indeed amazing that this
odd belief still persists in the face of Foucaults own subsequently published
methodological writings and such testimonials by proper social historians
as those found in the anthology of Foucault-positive historians Foucault and
the Writing of History.15 But while the myth of Foucault-as-discourse-analyst
that circulated among left historians in the late eighties is simply wrong,
since the most cursory reading of Discipline and Punish shows an author
obsessed with tracing the genealogy of practices of punishment and keen to
decentre ideologies and discourses, it may be that this false impression was
supported by the lingering whiff of structuralism in such works as Foucaults
The Order of Things and the inaugural lecture The Order of Discourse.
This, however, seems like another overly flattering and rationalist expla-
nation. The Order of Things has been read by a negligible number of social
historians, so is not likely to have been the source of misunderstanding.
Even The Order of Discourse, with its structuralist-sounding lists of rules
for the formation and reorganization of discourses, is very rarely cited in his-
torical works, even historiographical ones. Foucaults undeserved notoriety
as promoter of vulgar discourse analysis more likely rests not on a thorough
critical reading of his work but rather on social historians distaste for some
of the quasi-intellectual history produced by some enthusiastic social scien-
tists claiming to be doing Foucauldian history or genealogy.
14 Paul Veyne, Foucault Revolutionizes History, in A. Davison, ed., Foucault and his Interlocutors
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 177.
15 P. Rabinow, ed., Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity, Truth (New York: The New Press, 1997), vol.
1 of The Essential Works of Michel Foucault; J. Goldstein, ed., Foucault and the Writing of History
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
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My own view, for what it may be worth, is that The Order of Discourse
is not very helpful because its list of rules is too abstract and static to be of
much use in historical investigation. Although Foucault would not have
subscribed to the rigid Althusserian scheme in which monolithic capitalist
subjectivities are constituted by ideological state apparatuses, nevertheless
his writing of the 1960s shows a certain structuralist style of reasoning that
does not easily lend itself to historical investigations. Poststructuralism,
with its interest in the ambiguity and instability of meaning and the conse-
quent fragmentation of subjectivity, is more suited to historical analysis,
particularly if one wants to emphasize the ways in which the projects of
authorities are constantly at risk of failure. For heuristic purposes it may be
useful to classify Foucault among poststructuralist thinkers, but this is not
the truth about his work. He consistently stayed away from cultural stud-
ies and from the philosophical debates, to pursue a path that in his more
structuralist days he called archeology and that he later called, after
Nietzsche, genealogy.
In some places (Britain especially), poststructuralist social theory tended
to be practised by people in cultural studies who studied signs and mean-
ings, especially from popular culture, without doing any sociological or his-
torical research about the biography or the social effect of those signs. In
Britain, Foucauldian sociology developed as a more or less materialist
answer or counterweight to the growing influence of cultural studies in soci-
ology departments. In North America, however, where social science
research had by no means been displaced or shaken up by cultural studies, it
was not uncommon for scholars of my generation to combine the poststruc-
turalist analytic methods learned in the late eighties from cultural studies
and philosophy with an increasing reliance on the tools developed both by
Foucault and by those who followed in his wake: the tools of genealogical
studies of history of the present. History of the present and governmentality
studies were exciting for many of us precisely because we became increas-
ingly aware of the limitations of discourse analysis  although, as just
stated, we tended to be more eclectic and occasionally to integrate the ana-
lytic tools and research questions of cultural studies with governmentality
perspectives. The history of the present, however, seemed to have very
little impact among historians, perhaps because of the prevalence of the
mistaken belief that to use Foucault meant, automatically, to pursue idealist
discourse analysis. Even today, the international History of the Present
e-mail list run out of York University seems to have very few subscribers
who are historians, and historians are conspicuously absent from the highly
interdisciplinary History of the Present local Toronto research group.
For me, discovering the English and Australian governmentality litera-
ture produced mainly by Foucauldian sociologists enabled me to begin to
find a way out of what I felt was the impasse of discourse analysis. Dis-
course analysis had enabled me to show that an apparently harmless box of
matches or bar of soap was marketed with images that constituted particular
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imperial and colonial subjectivities,16 but it alone could not tell us what his-
torical weight one should assign to those particular symbols, since it could
not show where else and by what other means those same subjectivities were
being constituted.
After Discourse: From “Interests” to “Effects”
That discourses, however powerful, are never auto-effective was the great
lost insight of the non-debates on discourse of the late 1980s and early
1990s. If we had collectively discussed that insight  and by we I mean a
significant grouping of both old-fashioned and poststructuralist historical
researchers  we might indeed have generated more fruitful insights than
our more polemically oriented British and American counterparts. Opportu-
nities for debate are few and far between in the English Canadian context,
however; when debates do happen, a sort of Greshams law of intellectual
discourse seems to prevail by which the self-aggrandizing polemics of the
few preclude the flourishing of reasoned arguments among the many.
The state of affairs after the discourse debates does not lend itself to gen-
eralization, since no particular paradigm or even debate seems to have
emerged to replace the never resolved discourse battles. It may be that,
although the non-debate did not do my generation any good, it has benefitted
younger scholars. Younger historians do sometimes use bits of discourse
analysis or the odd theoretical tool in their history dissertations. But recent
and current history dissertations of which I am aware still seem to be written
with a fundamentally conservative epistemology, in which cultural analysis
is used largely as a supplement and usually very tentatively.
For work that takes place wholly within the discipline of history, this
band-aid solution  keep using traditional epistemology but indulge in
occasional discourse analysis of texts or symbols that seem obviously rhetor-
ical  may be an excellent one. Most historians do not feel any need to have
extended discussions about epistemology. In some more novel and interdis-
ciplinary areas, however, for example, in what has come to be called histor-
ical epistemology, there are interesting theoretical developments that would
likely repay attention.17
I will not attempt to describe the variety of post-discourse analysis meth-
odological innovations that have emerged, since such a description could
only be carried out from some godlike place above the fray. There has been a
fragmentation of politically progressive work in all the disciplines with
which I am familiar, such that people are no longer even having major
debates that everybody knows about. People seem now to be going about
16 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest (New
York: Routledge, 1995).
17 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Lorraine
Daston, Classical Probability in the Age of Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988); Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (New York: Zone
Books, 1998); and Ian Hackings numerous works.
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their business, seeking like-minded companions but avoiding staging grand
debates along the lines of yesteryears spectacular shows of E. P. Thompson
versus the Althusserians. Thus, all that I can do here is simply describe some
of my own recent methodological preoccupations, in the hope that they serve
to stimulate a sharing of worries and enthusiasms about how we do research
and how we write it, a sharing that goes further than one can when chatting
with ones best friend or putting a short message on an e-mail list.
Looking back, not only at my own work but at the intellectual and politi-
cal context in which it has developed, if I had to choose one theme or insight
to serve as emblem of the differences between the work done before dis-
course analysis and the work done after discourse analysis, I would highlight
the difference between research that asks about interests and research that
asks about effects. (Discourse analysis is here in between, with my own
book on social purity serving perhaps as a good example.) The new social
history gave us a number of new tools to do research, but the sophistication
in research methods was generally employed to explore some rather simple
(if important) questions. The basic question driving socialist feminist inquir-
ies as well as Marxist ones was: Whose interests are served? Who benefits?
This question is of course rooted in the critique of ideology paradigm
developed by Marx, Gramsci, and later feminist and anti-imperialist writers.
Interests are real enough, and they of course shape social processes includ-
ing epistemological developments. The problem, however, is that the critique
of ideology paradigm tended to explain every little development, from the
invention of double-entry bookkeeping to the rise of the Internet café, by ref-
erence to a grand narrative about bourgeois (or patriarchal, or colonial) inter-
ests, without actually explaining how this or that little innovation was in fact
related to the quasi-transcendental interests that supposedly drove it. What
exactly is to be gained, in terms of our understanding of the actual, empirical
relations of ruling, by immediately proceeding to explain every little thing as
due to or explained by this or that macro-level interest?
Like others, I believed for some time that discourse analysis might give us
tools for filling in that middle space between the often trivially contingent
details of everyday life and the macro-level interests that lurk underneath. An
increased sophistication in the tools available to examine specific cultural
constellations and processes does help to explain how capitalism and male
domination can be at the same time universally powerful and yet so chame-
leon-like. But coming up with ever more sophisticated tools to demonstrate
what we already know  that large-scale material interests do shape history
 is, for me at least, increasingly unattractive as a way to spend my time.
Inspired by Foucault, by Paul Veyne, by Deleuze, and also by Mary Poovey,
Ian Hacking, and other practitioners of historical epistemology, who trace the
development of knowledge formats through history without constantly ask-
ing about interests, I have come to the conclusion that it may be more pro-
ductive to put inquiries into interests temporarily on hold. Instead, I am
experimenting with questions that focus on effects. Let me try to explain.
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When asked to explain Foucaults method, his fellow philosopher and
admirer Gilles Deleuze observed that the metaphor for analysis that Foucault
might have used is one drawn from Paul Valerys remark that le plus pro-
fond, cest la peau.18 The Valery-Deleuze metaphor of dermatology can
help us to understand the shift that I am discussing here, from interest-based
inquiries to inquiries about effects. The dermatological approach is not posi-
tivist: it does not declare a priori that explanations need to remain at the sur-
face level, since changes on the skin are after all related to changes
elsewhere in the body. Dermatological analysis is genuinely interested in
what can be seen, however, and is to that extent empirical in the most direct
sense, as is (contrary to popular opinion) most of Foucaults historical work.
Let us turn for a minute to the famous opening pages of Foucaults Disci-
pline and Punish, which recount in nauseating detail the particular way in
which a particular criminal was put to death. Whereas Marxist social history
discusses executions in terms of class interests served, state power upheld,
and so forth, Foucaults tremendously detailed description of one particular
execution did not immediately jump to the level of unseen interests and
invisible processes of state formation. It asked questions about the signifi-
cance of choosing this method of torture and execution rather than a different
one  questions raised neither by political economists nor by Thompsonite
social historians.
The new Thompson-influenced social history was more interested than
Marxism had been in the details of what actually happened. Yet, in keeping
with the critique-of-ideology paradigm, social historians tend to assume that,
however fascinating the details, the meaning of what can actually be seen is
to be found somewhere underneath appearances. The state, capital accumu-
lation, bourgeois morality ... these are the real truths. The rich detail about
executions, about clothes, about body gestures and adornment, about jokes
and songs, about labour processes was regarded as ultimately worth recount-
ing only if it pointed to (or even, in the more Marxist-idealist versions of his-
tory, illustrated) deeper processes. In the area of leisure, for instance,
information about drinking habits and about the regulation of drinking found
in most social history works tends to be provided by way of illustrating
some largely invisible process of class control. Why English pubs are regu-
lated through licences granted by justices of the peace, while the consump-
tion of alcohol is regulated through state monopolies in Ontario and Finland,
at the same time that alcohol has not been historically differentiated from
other drinks in yet other jurisdictions  this sort of question was left
unasked. The actual governance of drinking is of little interest in its own
right: it becomes interesting only when regarded as a sort of surrogate vari-
able for class relations. The social historians of leisure, in other words, are
not really interested in drinking and its governance. They regard the prac-
tices of drinking and its regulation as a cabinet of curiosities that can be used
18 Gilles Deleuze, Pourparlers (Paris: Éditions de minuit, 1990), pp. 119120.
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to liven up ones books but that have no more theoretical significance than
the particular methods of executing criminals.19
The little technologies used to constitute and govern everyday practices
 the way criminals are executed, the way that beer is poured, dispensed,
and drunk  lie at the dermatological level. They are on the surface. One
of course has to make a judgement about which particular practice to regard
as worth analysing in detail, and that judgement will obviously be produced
with the aid of a number of different sources, many of them theoretical. The
point of all the philosophical and historical reading, however, is to help us to
understand what is in front of us rather than to spin stories about the under-
lying processes.
It was Nietzsche, not Foucault, who most thoroughly attacked the assump-
tion  made by socialist feminist historians as much as by metaphysicians
 that truth, or at least the important truths, are somewhere beneath appear-
ances. Nietzsche argued that the deeds studied by history and the other
human sciences ought not to be immediately ascribed to transcendental enti-
ties  the free will, in the case of metaphysics, or the dialectic of labour and
capital in the case of Marxist history. Social actions are best regarded as sub-
jectless effects  subjectless because the (free) subject is the biggest of all
fictions, the most important invisible, transcendental, reified object. What
humans do, therefore, ought not to be regarded either as a series of discrete
acts of will (as is the case not only in philosophy but in many social history
eulogies of working-class agency) or as the inevitable aggregate result of
large historical forces (as in the Marxist structuralist tradition). Nietzsche
invites us to analyse social relations in terms of deeds, which are neither
actions in the Weberian sense nor events in the positivist sense. Deeds can
be studied without much reference to the tired dichotomies of agency and
structure, freedom and constraint, and what is to be studied about deeds is
precisely their effects.
This approach needs to be differentiated from another that originates in
the same Nietzschean critique of metaphysics but has very different effects,
namely postmodernism. Postmodern writing typically states that causality
is a fiction, that everything is in chaos, that the universe is a flux of subject-
less deeds and meaningless events. Postmodern writers share Foucaults
sense that the subject is a fiction, and they also share his rejection of grand
narratives à la Marx, the narratives that underpin structuralism. Foucault
does not commit the postmodern fallacy of writing grand narratives about
19 Paul Veyne argues that Foucaults approach to history is more empirical than that of the new social
history because Foucaults detailed descriptions of particular practices of governing do not presup-
pose the existence of any goal, object, material cause (the governed masses, relations of production,
an enduring State) or type of behaviour (politics, depolitization). It consists in judging people by their
actions and in eliminating the eternal phantoms that language arouses in us. Practice is not some mys-
terious agency, some substratum of history, some hidden engine: it is what people do (Foucault
Revolutionizes History, p. 153).
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the decline of grand narratives, however. Rejecting the surface-depth binary
opposition does not mean rejecting causality as such. Foucault famously
said, Let us lighten the weight of causality; he did not say, There is no
causality. In keeping with Foucaults misunderstood advice, the approach I
advocate here does not refuse causality altogether; it only refuses to look for
causes underneath events. That particular events have particular causes, as
old-fashioned non-Marxist historians like to remind us, is hardly a new
thought: the suspicion of underlying logics is not unique to history of the
present approaches. The history of the present is perhaps characterized by
arguing that it is possible to do theoretically informed historical research
while looking around, sideways as it were, rather than looking downwards
into the nether regions populated by such spectral entities as capital, the
state, and patriarchy. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault argued that
Benthams panopticon could be regarded as a diagram for a kind of power/
knowledge that proliferated in a whole array of institutions from the early
nineteenth century onwards. Foucault chose to use the concrete image of the
panopticon as the emblem for discipline, rather than providing a tight,
Weberian definition of an ideal type of power/knowledge. The method-
ological effect of this is to highlight the similarities among various institu-
tions, rather than describing jails and schools and mental hospitals as
instances of some ideal-type. The similarities highlighted by history of the
present studies, furthermore, tend to be at the level of techniques of gover-
nance: the panopticon is literally a technique for observing. And in looking
sideways to find correspondences and to document movements by which
techniques of governance are devised at one locale and borrowed for a dif-
ferent purpose elsewhere, we may never be able to say with authority just
what weight is to be ascribed to one particular cause among a set of con-
verging causes. Foucaults Discipline and Punish certainly does not refuse to
investigate antecedents, alternatives that failed, and other causal-type rela-
tionships, the processes that are the bread and butter of all history writing,
but neither does it claim to tell us exactly what caused the modern peniten-
tiary to triumph over other practices of punishment, unlike social-control
historians who tell us that this process of class formation or that larger ideo-
logical current was ultimately determining. Thus, without making metaphys-
ical statements against causality as such, as postmodern philosophers like to
do, Foucault manages to lighten the weight of causality by emphasizing
transfers of techniques of governance across different sites, transfers that are
often ad hoc and motivated by local pragmatic requirements rather than by
grand ideological currents or class interests.
Just as Deleuze has speculated that we may do well to think of the inner
self as the inward folding of a surface, a fold in what we see rather than
something beneath or beyond, I think we can say that what is a cause and
what is an effect is a matter of context and perspective. If I am trying to
explain the demise of the debates on discourse, for instance, I need not look
somewhere below: I am simply redescribing the debates, in part moved by a
Rise and fall of discourse analysis 75
knowledge of what has happened since and what has become important now.
The point about now as starting point for history writing is liable to be mis-
understood as a simple case of presentism. I do not think that it is presen-
tist, however, to look back and acknowledge, for example, that Joan Scotts
intervention into the discourse wars ended up having a stifling and silencing
effect rather than provoking articulate sophisticated responses and that this
effect, which only became visible as the years went by, is an important 
though of course not the sole  dimension of the meaning of Joan Scott
as a historical personage. Examining the subsequent contingent effects of
contingent events is the sort of genealogical inquiry that proceeds on a totally
different terrain than that in which one might discuss the unprovable claim
that the whole debate on discourse was caused by some macro process, like
the defeat of the traditional left by the forces of identity politics.
From this perspective, inquiries about effects are bound to be, first, histor-
ically and culturally specific; secondly, focused more on the how of gover-
nance than on who or why; and finally (a point not made in all histories
of the present, but which I happen to think is crucial) reflexive, that is,
undertaken with close attention to the inquirers own situation. In Donna
Haraways famous phrase that fits nicely with the genealogical approach,
there is no Gods eye view. There are only particular, situated, always
somewhat personal accounts of events that are always particular and at least
to some degree contingent  hence this articles first-person style. Paying
attention to our own history is, I would argue, an antidote against the sort of
unconscious presentism that we all dislike about Whig histories. Thus, his-
tory of the present is not presentist history; it is history that acknowledges
that we who write history live in the present. Or, to specify a little more: it is
a kind of history that first looks for effects, then and only then investigates
possible causes, without ever claiming certainty about them, and only after
that considers factors such as intentionsand interests. Furthermore, his-
tory of the present tends to be more reflexive than traditional social history,
since it begins by acknowledging the situatedness of the historian. Research
aimed at documenting effects necessarily proceeds from a particular place,
since what counts as a significant effect will vary depending on ones stand-
point, and of course what counts as an adequate account of the causes of
some event will also depend on the social organization of the audience for
whom the account is intended.
One important insight that I borrow from Nietzsches work  that human
beings are constantly imagining that event X or Y is really determined by
the position of the stars, by the dialectic of capital, or by some other grand
process, thus avoiding the need to think through contingency itself  has
been implicitly taken up by history perhaps more than by any other disci-
pline, but still in a very incomplete and often untheorized manner. Histori-
ans, especially progressive, from-the-bottom-up social historians, have
excelled in documenting the contingency of events, of course, but they have
rarely paid attention to the contingency of their own accounts of such events.
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(Anthropologists are by and large better trained, these days, to attend to the
way in which their own gaze and even their own body affects what they
observe.) All historians, whether traditional or critical/leftist, agree that their
own accounts are not infallible and that later research may prove them
wrong: but this admission of fallibility is nothing but the reassertion of the
old positivist scientific method, a method which, as Nietzsche also pointed
out, acts as a psychological defence mechanism against the fear of everlast-
ing flux, situatedness, and contingency.
Reflecting upon how the tools with which we do our research and our
writing were themselves produced historically is not something that is much
encouraged in history departments, or in social science departments for that
matter, where methods are reified and presented as if they had no temporal
and spatial coordinates and no cultural baggage. Of course it is possible that
reflecting upon the historicity of our basic tools (such as the very notion of
cause or the assumptions about intentionality and human agency that suf-
fuse most social history) might lead to anxiety and writers block. But one
could argue that Canadian historians might benefit from moderately
increased levels of theoretical and methodological anxiety. The fear that
paralysis will be their fate if they stop along their professional road to get
acquainted with theoretical debates in anthropology or philosophy, while not
completely unfounded, is vastly exaggerated: it is a theoretical version of the
old domino theory. Postmodern theorists of course play right into this fear,
by putting themselves forward as latter-day Antichrists and declaring that,
since there is no objective truth, everything is equally subjective and equally
good or bad. Relativism is, after all, the obverse of vulgar positivism. Those
of us who prefer historical inquiry to grand philosophical claims might do
well to be sceptical of Antichrists as well as of more conventional prophets;
we might remember that just because there is no absolute truth does not
mean that there arent any lies.
For me, what is exciting about the current state of historical sociology
today is not, as postmodern types would have it, that we have declared that
God/objectivity is dead. That, after all, was done by Nietzsche a good 100
years ago. What is exciting about our own present is that God has now been
dead long enough that we have started to learn to mistrust not only Hegelian
stories but all manner of God-substitutes, including Antichrists. On my
good days, I believe that we are now in a position to do something more
constructive than to go around, like Nietzsche in his crazier later life or like
Lyotard, prophetically proclaiming the end of grand narratives. We are now
in a position to try the admittedly difficult task of taking contingency and
historical specificity seriously, while remaining interested in larger ques-
tions about governance and about forms of power that go beyond the local
and the particular.
This may look to some like a return to historical sociology  but
although the questions animating genealogical inquiry bear a family resem-
blance to those posed by historical sociology, the analyses produced tend to
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look very different, since genealogy attempts to make do without the gener-
alizations and ideal types that have populated traditional historical sociol-
ogy. Diagrams of power rather than ideal types of power; horizontal
inquiries into the dissemination and articulation of apparently minor tech-
niques for counting, seeing, and governing rather than downward inquiries
into interests: historians of the present, while remaining a very diverse lot,
tend to share some intellectual habits that do not amount to a new theory or a
new historiography but that provide a very loose basis for companionship.
Since much of this argument has sought to differentiate history of the
present approaches from those of labour and working-class history, it may be
useful to conclude by noting one commonality that lies more at the level of
ethics and politics than at that of method. Much left history has been moti-
vated by a desire to rescue from the condescension of history modes of life
and modes of political action that, while ultimately unsuccessful, can inspire
us in the present to continue challenging the taken-for-granted values of late
capitalism. This ethical-political force is also at the root of Foucaults own
inquiries and continues to motivate at least the more left-wing currents of
history of the present.20 Of course, history of the present does not glorify
past movements or failed revolutions, and it emphasizes that even the
oppressed manage to do a fair bit of governing. Nevertheless, historians of
the present of my acquaintance are not content merely to describe this or that
process of governance. We hope that by documenting and describing and
mapping we will manage to make clear that the societies in which we live
did not have to take the course they did; while sceptical about revolution
and even about resistance, we nevertheless remain keen to expose the con-
tingency of our present. Contingency means that things did not have to pro-
ceed as they in fact did. Derrida recently wrote that philosophers have not
yet followed Nietzsches invitation to stop thinking about and through neces-
sity and begin thinking about and through contingency, Nietzsches ringing
call for us (free spirits) to become philosophers of the perhaps.21 It may
be that those of us who do historical work are in a better position than phi-
losophers like Derrida to take contingency seriously, to try to work as histo-
rians not of labour or of capital or of imperialism, but, more modestly and
empirically, as historians of the perhaps.
20 Some historians of the present use genealogical tools to praise liberal methods of governance and
denounce the work of socialist and feminist intellectuals (particularly in Australia), but the Toronto
History of the Present group as well as the London-based network have a distinct, if amorphous, left
and feminist orientation.
21 J. Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 1997). See also Mariana Valverde, The Personal is
Political: Justice and Gender in Deconstruction, Economy and Society, vol. 28, no. 2 (May 1999), pp.
300311.
